Heraeus Medical GMBH v. Esschem Inc by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-21-2019 
Heraeus Medical GMBH v. Esschem Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Heraeus Medical GMBH v. Esschem Inc" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 508. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/508 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 18-1368 
_____________ 
 
HERAEUS MEDICAL GMBH, 
 
Appellant 
v. 
 
ESSCHEM, INC. 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-14-cv-05169) 
Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe, U.S. District Judge 
_______________ 
 
Argued: October 23, 2018 
 
Before: KRAUSE, COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  June 21, 2019) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
Bruce P. Merenstein 
Samuel W. Silver 
John R. Timmer 
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis 
1600 Market Street 
Suite 3600 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
John Nilsson 
Matthew M. Wolf  [Argued] 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer 
601 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20001 
 
R. Reeves Anderson 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer 
370 Seventeenth St. 
Suite 4400 
Denver, CO 80202 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Heraeus Medical 
GmbH 
 
Benjamin P. Gilford 
Greenberg Traurig 
333 Southeast 2nd Avenue 
Suite 4400 
Miami, FL 33131 
 
Richard D. Harris  [Argued] 
Cameron M. Nelson 
Gregory E. Ostfeld 
Greenberg Traurig 
  
3 
77 West Wacker Drive 
Suite 3100 
Chicago, IL 60601 
 
Mary F. Platt 
Fineman Krekstein & Harris 
Ten Penn Center 
1801 Market Street, Suite 1100 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Esschem, Inc. 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
The case before us involves another skirmish in a long-
running, cross-border court battle over the alleged theft of a 
trade secret: Heraeus Medical GmbH’s recipe for its bone 
cement.  In this appeal, we consider whether Heraeus’ suit 
against Esschem, Inc.—a company that works as a chemical 
manufacturer for Heraeus’ main competitor—is barred by the 
statute of limitations under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act.  At summary judgment, the District Court held 
that all of Heraeus’ claims, including those for Esschem’s 
alleged continuing misappropriation during the three-year 
limitations period, are time-barred and entered judgment for 
Esschem.  We agree that alleged misappropriations that 
occurred more than three years before Heraeus filed suit are 
time-barred, but because we hold that Pennsylvania applies the 
rule of separate accrual to continuing trade secret 
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misappropriations, Heraeus may sue for misappropriations that 
occurred within the three-year period before filing.  We thus 
will reverse in part and affirm in part the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment. 
 
I.  Background1 
 
Heraeus is a German company that develops and 
produces Palacos, a bone cement used to anchor artificial joints 
in joint replacement surgeries.  To make Palacos, Heraeus 
developed its own particular process to manufacture two key 
components: copolymers known as R262 and R263 (the 
“copolymers”).  Biomet also sells bone cement and is one of 
Heraeus’ major competitors in this market.  To make its bone 
cement, Biomet uses the same copolymers, which it buys from 
Esschem, a Pennsylvania company that manufactures acrylic 
polymers and monomers.  
 
Heraeus holds trade secrets related to the “overall 
specifications for the . .  . bone cement,” including 
                                              
1 The facts set forth here are drawn from a combination 
of the District Court’s recital of the facts and the parties’ 
submissions on summary judgment.  To the extent certain 
background facts appear only in the District Court opinion, we 
note that the District Court appears to have drawn them from 
the complaint, although Esschem indicated it was “without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief” about 
many of those facts.  Esschem’s Answer at 1–10, ECF No. 87.  
Nonetheless, because these allegations pertain only to general 
background and Esschem does not take issue with them on 
appeal, we will reference them where relevant. 
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“specifications for [the] copolymers.”  App. 81.  These trade 
secrets changed hands several times over the years before 
allegedly falling into Esschem’s possession.  In 1972, thirteen 
years after Palacos first came on the market, Heraeus entered 
into a distribution agreement with Merck, pursuant to which 
Heraeus disclosed its trade secrets so that Merck could “obtain 
and maintain regulatory approval” to distribute Palacos.  App. 
84.  Merck was also obligated under the agreement to protect 
Heraeus’ trade secrets from disclosure to third parties without 
first obtaining Heraeus’ consent.  This arrangement was in 
place until 1997, when Merck and Biomet entered into a joint 
venture that took over the distribution of Palacos.  At that point, 
Heraeus agreed to supply the joint venture, and only Merck, 
pursuant to its confidentiality agreement with Heraeus, had 
access to the trade secrets covering the copolymers. 
 
In 2004, however, Biomet acquired Merck’s shares in 
the joint venture, taking over the distribution agreement and, 
unbeknownst to Heraeus, also gaining access to Heraeus’ trade 
secrets.  Upon learning of the joint venture’s sale to its 
competitor, Heraeus announced it would terminate the 
distribution agreement in August 2005, but by the time 
Heraeus severed its ties with Biomet, Biomet had already 
launched its own competing bone cement—a feat that Heraeus 
alleges its “competitors had failed to do for decades” and that 
it contends has since cost it 50 percent of its market share.  
App. 88.  Suspecting that Biomet’s bone cement was created 
using its trade secrets, Heraeus acquired and analyzed samples 
of Biomet’s bone cement in 2005 and discovered that, except 
for “[m]inor discrepancies,” it “w[as] virtually identical to” 
Heraeus’ bone cement and that Esschem was manufacturing 
the copolymer components for Biomet.  App. 89.    
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Over the next few years, Heraeus took legal action to 
protect its trade secrets.  It filed suit for trade secret 
misappropriation against Biomet in Germany in December 
2008, and shortly thereafter, in aid of that litigation, brought 
discovery suits in the United States against both Esschem and 
Biomet.2 
 
In its discovery suit against Esschem, Heraeus sought 
“documents relating to communications between Esschem and 
. . . Biomet . . . regarding the development” of the copolymers.  
In re Heraeus Kulzer GmbH, 2009 WL 2981921, at *3.  At the 
time, Heraeus’ theory was that Biomet had “instruct[ed 
Esschem] to manufacture [the copolymers] using Heraeus’ 
highly confidential information and trade secrets.”  App. 651.  
After an appeal, this Court ordered expedited discovery from 
Esschem in July 2010.  Heraeus Kulzer GmbH, 390 F. App’x 
at 93.  Esschem then produced several e-mail chains between 
employees of Biomet and Esschem in which they discussed the 
development of the copolymers.  In those chains, all of which 
had been produced to Heraeus by March 2011, Biomet 
employees Dan Smith and Rainer Specht specifically 
“discuss[ed] the specifications for R262 and R263” with 
Esschem employees.  Appellee’s Br. 37–38.     
 
                                              
2 In re Heraeus Kulzer GmbH, No. 09-MC-00017, 2009 
WL 2981921 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 11, 2009), rev’d by Heraeus 
Kulzer GmbH v. Esschem, Inc., 390 F. App’x 88 (3d Cir. 
2010); In re Application of Heraeus Kulzer for Order Pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. Section 1782, No. 3:09-CV-183 RM, 2009 WL 
2058718 (N.D. Ind. Jul. 9, 2009), rev’d by Heraeus Kulzer, 
GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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Discovery against Esschem ended sometime between 
August and December 2011, but discovery and litigation 
against Biomet continued for several more years.  In the course 
of the proceedings against Biomet—specifically, in a 
December 2011 deposition—Dan Smith corroborated what the 
e-mail chains had indicated: that Biomet employees were 
“direct participants,” Appellant’s Br. 11 (quoting Sealed App. 
1703) in the development of the copolymers and that “their 
work with Esschem . . . ultimately led to the copolymers 
manufactured by Esschem for use in Biomet’s bone cement,” 
id.  Heraeus contends it was not until “that time,” i.e., 
December 2011, that it had “sufficient information to believe 
that Esschem had actively participated in the misappropriation 
of [its] trade secrets.”  Id. at 12.   
 
Just short of three years later, on September 8, 2014, 
Heraeus sued Esschem for trade secret misappropriation in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The complaint included one 
count for misappropriation of trade secrets under the 
Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act (PUTSA) and five 
counts for common law claims.3   
 
Following discovery, Esschem moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that all of Heraeus’ claims were time-
barred.  Under the PUTSA, a plaintiff has three years from 
when “the misappropriation was discovered or by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence should have been discovered” to bring 
                                              
3 Those common law claims were: (1) conspiracy to 
misappropriate a trade secret; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) unfair 
competition; (4) tortious interference with economic 
advantage; and (5) conversion. 
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suit.  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5307.  Esschem argued that Heraeus 
discovered or should have discovered the alleged 
misappropriations as early as 2005, making its PUTSA claims 
untimely.  And because the common law claims were based on 
the same facts as the PUTSA claims and were subject to 
statutes of limitations of no more than four years, they were 
also untimely. 
 
In its opposition motion, Heraeus countered that it did 
not discover the necessary facts to sue for trade secret 
misappropriation until “the end of 2011,” and that any dispute 
over when it discovered those facts was an issue of triable fact 
that precluded summary judgment.  App. 663.  Heraeus also 
urged that continuing misappropriations were subject to the 
separate accrual rule, so that, under the PUTSA, each 
additional use of Heraeus’ trade secrets within three years of 
the filing of the complaint gave rise to a separate and timely 
cause of action. 
 
The District Court rejected both of Heraeus’ arguments 
and ruled that the statutes of limitations had run on its PUTSA 
and common law claims.  At the very latest, the Court found, 
Heraeus was aware of “the facts supporting its 
misappropriation claims” against Esschem by January 2009.  
Heraeus Med. GmbH v. Esschem, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 3d 855, 
861 (E.D. Pa. 2018).  It also held that Esschem’s additional 
uses of the trade secrets between September 2011 and the filing 
of the complaint in September 2014 were part of a single and 
time-barred cause of action under the PUTSA because 
Esschem’s continued use of the trade secrets was “nothing 
more than a continuation of the original alleged 
misappropriation.”  Id. at 863.  Interpreting the PUTSA to 
adopt the separate accrual rule, it reasoned, would “eliminate 
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the statute of limitations altogether” by allowing Heraeus to 
“sit by for nearly a decade” after learning all facts necessary to 
bring a claim and to obtain damages for the entire period so 
long as one misappropriation took place within the statute of 
limitations.4  Id.  On that basis, the Court granted summary 
judgment for Esschem, and Heraeus now appeals. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Because we are sitting in diversity and Heraeus brings 
state claims, we apply Pennsylvania law to address the parties’ 
arguments related to the PUTSA’s statute of limitations.  See 
Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 
533 (1949); Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citing Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945)). 
 
We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 
208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015).  To prevail at this stage, the moving 
party must establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
                                              
4 The District Court correctly identified the tension 
between those jurisdictions that treat continuing 
misappropriations as a single claim and those that treat 
continuing misappropriations as a series of separate 
misappropriations subject to the separate accrual rule.  As we 
explain below, however, it was mistaken in conflating the 
effect of the separate accrual rule with the effect of the 
continuing violation doctrine on the statute of limitations.  See 
infra Section III.B.2. 
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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  All facts should be viewed “in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” with “all 
reasonable inferences [drawn] in that party’s favor.”  
Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher 
Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006).  A factual dispute is 
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
On appeal, Heraeus raises the same two arguments it did 
below.  First, it contends that it did not discover sufficient facts 
to state a claim against Esschem until December 2011, and 
therefore its September 2014 suit fell within the three-year 
limitations period.  And to the extent there is a dispute over 
when Heraeus discovered sufficient facts to state a claim, 
Heraeus argues, this is a factual dispute for the jury.  Second, 
Heraeus posits that even if the limitations period began to run 
before September 2011, Esschem would still be liable for each 
time it used the trade secrets to manufacture the copolymers 
between September 2011 and September 2014 because 
continuing misappropriations under the PUTSA are subject to 
the separate accrual rule.  We address these issues in turn.5 
 
                                              
5 The District Court dismissed Heraeus’ common law 
claims for the same reasons it dismissed its PUTSA claims.  On 
appeal, however, Heraeus directs its arguments only to its 
PUTSA claims and thus has waived any challenge to the denial 
of its common law claims. 
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A. The Commencement of the Limitations 
Period 
 
A “limitations period generally begins to run ‘as soon 
as [an] injury is sustained.’”  Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 
333, 344 n.13 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 
F.3d 502, 510 (3d Cir. 2006)).  In Pennsylvania, there are 
several “exception[s]” to this “general rule.”  Pocono Intern. 
Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 
1983).  One is the discovery rule, which evolved from the 
notion that a limitations period should not “run[] against” a 
plaintiff who is “ignorant of his loss.”  Lewey v. H.C. Frick 
Coke Co., 31 A. 261, 264 (Pa. 1895).  When the discovery rule 
applies, the limitations period only begins to run once the 
plaintiff is no longer “ignorant of his loss,” id., i.e., once he is 
able to “ascertain the fact of a cause of action,” Pocono, 468 
A.2d at 471.  That is not to say the period is suspended until 
the plaintiff has “acquired finite knowledge of all operative 
facts.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Rather, “[f]or the statute of 
limitations to run, a plaintiff need not know the ‘exact nature’ 
of his injury, as long as it objectively appears that the plaintiff 
‘is reasonably charged with the knowledge that he has an injury 
caused by another.’”  Mest, 449 F.3d 502, 510-11 (quoting 
Ackler v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 551 A.2d 291, 293 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1988)).   
 
The PUTSA explicitly incorporates the discovery rule.  
Under the statute, a plaintiff has three years to file an action for 
trade secret misappropriation once she “discover[s]” or 
“should have . . . discovered” the misappropriation.6  12 Pa. 
                                              
6 In full, this provision reads: “An action under this 
chapter for misappropriation must be brought within three 
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Cons. Stat. § 5307.  “Misappropriation,” in turn, is defined in 
several ways, but one definition in particular applies here:  If, 
as Heraeus contends, Esschem received Heraeus’ trade secrets 
not from Heraeus itself, but from Biomet, Esschem could be 
liable for “use of a trade secret of another without express or 
implied consent,” so long as, “at the time of . . . use,” Esschem 
“knew or had reason to know that [its] knowledge of the trade 
secret was . . . derived from or through a person who owed a 
duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit 
it use.”  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5302(2)(ii)(C).  In other words, 
the limitations period would only begin to run once Heraeus 
discovered sufficient facts to make it reasonably aware not 
only that Esschem used Heraeus’ trade secrets without 
Heraeus’ consent, but also that Esschem knew or had reason to 
know that Biomet owed a duty to Heraeus to maintain their 
secrecy.  Cf. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 637 
(2010) (holding that “scienter” is a fact which a plaintiff must 
discover in order for the statute of limitations to begin running 
on a § 10(b) claim under the Securities Exchange Act).   
 
According to Heraeus, it was not until it deposed 
Biomet’s Dan Smith in December 2011 that it obtained 
sufficient evidence of scienter.  Specifically, Heraeus directs 
us to two pieces of information that it asserts gave it notice of 
Esschem’s state of mind:  Smith’s testimony (1) that he and 
another Biomet employee were “direct participants” in work 
with Esschem; and (2) that this work with Esschem “ultimately 
led to the copolymers . . . for use in Biomet’s bone cements.”  
                                              
years after the misappropriation was discovered or by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.”  
12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5307. 
  
13 
Appellant’s Br. 11–12.  Heraeus contends those concessions 
finally revealed that “Esschem knew that Biomet was using 
stolen trade secrets.”  Id. at 33. 
 
But the argument proves too much, for if that 
information was sufficient to put Heraeus on notice of 
Esschem’s scienter, then Heraeus was necessarily on notice 
nine months earlier when it came into possession of essentially 
the same information.  In a March 2011 discovery production, 
Heraeus received, among other things, a 2004 e-mail exchange 
between Smith and Esschem in which Smith attempted to 
troubleshoot Esschem’s manufacturing difficulties, and, in 
declining to provide more detailed copolymer specifications, 
noted that doing so would disclose non-public information.  
But follow-up e-mails to Esschem from the other Biomet 
employee, Rainer Specht, which Heraeus also received in 
discovery by March 2011, did provide Esschem with those 
supposedly non-public details.  And soon thereafter, as 
Heraeus was well aware, Biomet released its competing bone 
cement. 
 
This sequence and the face of these detailed exchanges 
about the copolymer specifications reveal that the very facts 
that Heraeus claims it first learned in the December 2011 
deposition were in its possession by March 2011: (1) “direct 
participat[ion]” by Biomet employees in Esschem’s 
development of the copolymers; and (2) that this participation 
is what “ultimately led” to Esschem’s successful production of 
the copolymers.  Appellant’s Br. 11.  Moreover, the March 
2011 discovery revealed the additional fact that Esschem had 
reason to believe Specht’s subsequent disclosure of the 
copolymer specifications constituted non-public information, 
i.e., information that was “derived from or through a person 
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who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its 
secrecy.”  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5302.7  Thus, the information 
that Heraeus learned through Smith’s testimony was 
duplicative and, if anything, less revealing than the discovery 
it received in March 2011.  So, it was March 2011 when the 
limitations period began to run and March 2014, three years 
later, when it expired.8 
                                              
7 In a filing below, Heraeus itself touted this logic, 
describing the information in Specht’s later e-mails as “the 
same information that Esschem had previously requested [from 
Biomet] . . . [but] had been told that Biomet could not provide.”  
App. 142. 
8 The District Court held, and Esschem argues on 
appeal, that Heraeus had sufficient information to state a claim 
against Esschem at various points between 2005 and 2010, 
such as in January 2009, when Heraeus brought its discovery 
suit against Esschem in the United States.  At that time, 
Heraeus sought information from Esschem about its 
communications with Biomet because it believed that Biomet 
had “instruct[ed Esschem] to manufacture [the copolymers] 
using Heraeus’ highly confidential information and trade 
secrets.”  App. 651.  Esschem maintains that this suspicion was 
enough for Heraeus to bring suit for Esschem’s alleged 
misappropriations.  As Heraeus points out, however, without 
evidence that Esschem knew the instructions it was receiving 
from Biomet were derived from Heraeus’ trade secrets, the 
possibility that Esschem was “a total innocent” remained.  
Appellant’s Reply Br. 23.  In any event, we need not determine 
whether Heraeus could have stated a claim at some point before 
March 2011 because, outside of any claims that accrued in the 
three-year period before filing, its September 2014 suit was 
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Heraeus, however, did not file suit until September 
2014—three and a half years later.  Thus, any 
misappropriations prior to March 2011 and any that occurred 
between March and September 2011 (which would have been 
discovered as they occurred) are indeed time-barred. 
 
The question remains whether Esschem’s alleged 
continued use of Heraeus’ trade secrets between September 
2011 and September 2014 is properly viewed as part of one 
violation that is time-barred in its entirety, as the District Court 
held, or instead as a series of separate misappropriations that 
accrued individually and thus were timely asserted.  As we 
explain next, the PUTSA provides the answer. 
 
B. The Timeliness of Claims for 
Misappropriation After September 2011 
 
The Pennsylvania General Assembly based the PUTSA 
on the provisions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).  
But while it adopted most of those provisions, it opted to 
diverge from them in certain instances.  One such instance is 
in the treatment of a “continuing misappropriation.”  The 
UTSA provides:  
 
An action for misappropriation must be brought within 
3 years after the misappropriation is discovered or by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been 
discovered.  For the purposes of this section, a 
continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim. 
                                              
untimely even if the limitations period began to run earlier than 
March 2011. 
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Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 6 (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985).  In the 
PUTSA, the Pennsylvania General Assembly tracked this 
language nearly verbatim, except that it omitted the final 
sentence, so that Pennsylvania’s statute states simply: 
 
An action under this chapter for misappropriation must 
be brought within three years after the misappropriation 
was discovered or by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have been discovered. 
 
12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5307.   
 
The parties view the omission of the final sentence very 
differently.  Heraeus argues that the Pennsylvania legislature 
intended “each wrongful use of misappropriated trade secrets 
[to] trigger a distinct limitations period” and that, under this 
separate accrual rule, its claims for misappropriations between 
September 2011 and September 2014 are timely.  Appellant’s 
Br. 14.  Esschem, on the other hand, defends the District 
Court’s rejection of the separate accrual rule as a rule that 
would nullify the PUTSA’s statute of limitations, and it urges 
that we affirm the denial of Heraeus’ PUTSA claims as a 
single, time-barred cause of action. 
 
As explained below, Heraeus has the better of the 
argument.  The District Court erred in treating Esschem’s 
continued use of Heraeus’ trade secrets as a single 
misappropriation for three reasons: (1) the text of the PUTSA; 
(2) Pennsylvania’s common law rule of separate accrual, which 
provided the backdrop against which the PUTSA was drafted; 
and (3) Pennsylvania’s adoption of the Restatement of Torts, 
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which also endorses the separate accrual rule for continuing 
misappropriations.  We address these in turn. 
 
1. The PUTSA Treats Continuing 
Misappropriations as Separate 
Violations Subject to the Separate 
Accrual Rule 
 
a. The Text of the PUTSA 
 
The UTSA, by its terms, treats a continuing 
misappropriation as a single claim, but Pennsylvania, like 
some other states, opted not to enact that particular provision.  
See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 66-157 (North Carolina); Ala. 
Code § 8-27-5 (Alabama).  While we do not have the occasion 
to opine on the significance of that omission for other states, 
Pennsylvania’s canons of construction indicate that the 
omission reflects the General Assembly’s intent to apply the 
separate accrual rule to continuing misappropriations. 
 
Pennsylvania law provides that “[t]he object of all 
interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and 
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”  1 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 1921.  A situation like the one here, where the General 
Assembly omitted text from a borrowed statute, offers strong 
evidence of legislative intent.  See Fletcher v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 985 A.2d 678, 684 (Pa. 2009) (holding that 
“where a section of a statute contains a given provision, the 
omission of such a provision from a similar section is 
significant to show a different legislative intent”).  Under the 
“separate-accrual rule,” which we have defined as “[a] 
corollary of the standard rule” for accrual of federal causes of 
action, a continuing misappropriation gives rise to multiple 
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discrete claims corresponding to each act of misappropriation, 
and “[b]ecause each act violates the law on its own, each act 
separately triggers its own limitations period.”  Blake v. JP 
Morgan Chase NA, No. 18-2368, slip op. at 10 (3d Cir. June 
19, 2019).  The Uniform Law Commission expressly rejected 
this separate accrual rule in the second sentence of UTSA § 6 
by providing that “a continuing misappropriation constitutes a 
single claim,” i.e., not a series of claims.  Unif. Trade Secrets 
Act § 6 (emphasis added).  But the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly rejected that second sentence and retained only the 
first when it enacted PUTSA § 5307, indicating that it intended 
to retain the separate accrual rule.  See Fletcher, 985 A.2d at 
684. 
 
Esschem, however, asks us to ignore the significance of 
the second sentence’s omission and to imply the General 
Assembly’s rejection of the separate accrual rule into the first 
sentence.  But in interpreting a statute, “language should not be 
implied where excluded,” and we will not contravene 
legislative intent by reading into PUTSA § 5307 the very 
language that the General Assembly chose to omit.  Fonner v. 
Shandon, Inc., 724 A.2d 903, 907 (Pa. 1999).  Nor does the text 
of the first sentence support Esschem’s reading.  That sentence, 
which the General Assembly retained, simply specifies when 
the limitations period begins—which is when “the 
misappropriation is discovered” or “should have been 
discovered.”  Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 6.  It has no bearing on 
whether continuing misappropriations are treated as a single 
claim or multiple claims.  That is a separate question that is 
addressed by the UTSA’s second sentence, independent of the 
first. 
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The comments to the UTSA reinforce this reading of 
PUTSA § 5307.9  The UTSA drafters made explicit that they 
sought in § 6 to achieve two distinct results: (1) to “reject[] the 
continuing wrong approach,” under which “the limitation 
period with respect to a specific act of misappropriation begins 
at the time that the act of misappropriation occurs”—that is, to 
reject the separate accrual rule; and (2) to start the limitations 
period upon “discover[y of] the existence of 
misappropriation.”  Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 6 cmt.  
Esschem’s argument that the first sentence alone is sufficient 
to achieve both of these results is thus not only atextual, but it 
also renders the second sentence mere surplusage, contrary to 
Pennsylvania’s canons of construction.  See Matter of Emps. of 
Student Servs., Inc., 432 A.2d 189, 195 (Pa. 1981). 
 
We decline to adopt Esschem’s reading.  Instead, we 
glean from the text of the statutes that the UTSA adopted the 
discovery rule and single-claim treatment for continuing 
misappropriations, and the PUTSA embraced the UTSA’s 
discovery rule but declined its single-claim treatment in favor 
of the separate accrual rule. 
                                              
9 “The comments or report of the commission . . . which 
drafted a statute may be consulted in the construction or 
application of the original provisions of the statute” as long as 
those materials were available when the statute was drafted.  1 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1939.  Since the UTSA was last updated in 
1985 and the PUTSA was passed in 2004, the Uniform Law 
Commission’s comments are properly within the scope of our 
analysis.  See Advanced Fluid Sys., Inc. v. Huber, No. 1:13-
CV-3087, 2017 WL 2445303, at *11 n.7 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 
2017). 
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b. Pennsylvania’s Common Law 
Rule of Separate Accrual 
 
That the Pennsylvania legislature intended to follow the 
separate accrual rule is all the more apparent when we consider 
the omission of the UTSA’s second sentence against the 
backdrop of Pennsylvania common law. 
 
As explained by our former Chief Judge Edward Becker 
when he sat on the District Court in Anaconda Company v. 
Metric Tool & Die Company, Pennsylvania courts have 
adopted the “property” view of trade secrets, under which the 
basis of a claim for trade secret misappropriation is the 
violation of a property right, in contrast to the “confidential 
relationship” view, under which a misappropriation is based on 
a violation of a duty of confidentiality.  485 F. Supp. 410, 425–
26 (E.D. Pa. 1980).10  And the property view provides the 
                                              
10 See generally Van Prods. Co. v. Gen. Welding & 
Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 780 (Pa. 1965) (rejecting the 
confidential relationship view and holding that “[t]he starting 
point in every case of [trade secret misappropriation] is not 
whether there was a confidential relationship, but whether . . . 
there was a trade secret to be misappropriated”); Den-Tal-Ez, 
Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1228 (Pa. Super. 
1989) (noting that “Van Products has been construed to have 
adopted the ‘property’ view of trade secrets” and that “[c]ases 
decided more recently than Van Products make it clear that this 
is still the proper focus in a trade secrets case”); see also Moore 
v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc., 318 F.3d 561, 571 (3d Cir. 
2003) (discussing Van Products and its progeny); Sims v. Mack 
Truck Corp., 488 F. Supp. 592, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1980) 
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theoretical underpinnings for the separate accrual rule:  While 
a breach of confidentiality only occurs upon the initial 
misappropriation, and the “fabric of the [confidential] 
relationship once rent is not torn anew with each added use or 
disclosure,” under the property view, a trade secret “is in the 
nature of property[] [and] is damaged or destroyed by the 
adverse use,” such that “each use is a new wrong.”  Monolith 
Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 
407 F.2d 288, 293 (9th Cir. 1969).  It is for that reason, as Judge 
Becker held in applying Pennsylvania’s common law of trade 
secrets, that “the statute of limitations for the tort of wrongful 
use begins to run at the time of the wrongful use, and not at the 
time of the initial misappropriation.”  Anaconda, 485 F. Supp. 
at 426.  He recognized, in other words, that Pennsylvania’s 
common law embraced the separate accrual rule.   
 
Esschem takes issue with Anaconda’s holding on the 
ground that no Pennsylvania court “ever applied the separate 
accrual rule to common law trade secret claims.”  Appellee’s 
Br. 49–50.  But Anaconda’s reasoning is sound, and although 
no Pennsylvania court has explicitly discussed this reasoning, 
other courts have, confirming the separate accrual rule’s roots 
in the property view and its incompatibility with the 
confidential relationship view.  Compare Underwater Storage, 
Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 
(recognizing that use of a trade secret gives rise to a cause of 
action and allowing “suit for any use of the [trade] secret so 
long as the use has occurred within the statutory period of 
limitations immediately preceding the bringing of the action”), 
                                              
(“Pennsylvania cleaves to the ‘property’ view of trade secrets 
law.”).   
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with Monolith, 407 F.3d at 293 (holding that “[t]he cause of 
action arises but once,” when the confidential relationship is 
breached).  As the Fifth Circuit summarized, “[j]urisdictions 
that adopt the ‘breach theory’ of trade secret misappropriation, 
as opposed to the ‘property theory,’ generally do not treat trade 
secret misappropriation as a continuing tort.”  Gen. Universal 
Sys., Inc. v. HAL, Inc., 500 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2007); see 
also Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. 
App. 4th 575, 582 (2008) (collecting cases and noting the 
same).   
 
We hold today that this common law rule was not 
displaced by the PUTSA.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has long instructed that “provisions in derogation of the 
common law are to be held strictly,” Gibson v. Commonwealth, 
87 Pa. 253, 256 (1878), and that “[s]tatutes are never presumed 
to make any innovation in the rules and principles of the 
common law or prior existing law beyond what is expressly 
declared in their provisions,” Rahn v. Hess, 106 A.2d 461, 464 
(Pa. 1954).  The PUTSA “expressly declare[s]” only that trade 
secret misappropriation claims are subject to the discovery 
rule.  So by omitting the UTSA’s second sentence, the General 
Assembly in effect codified Pennsylvania common law, 
foregoing the single-claim approach in favor of the separate 
accrual rule and harmonizing the PUTSA with Pennsylvania’s 
property view of trade secrets.  Far from abrogating the 
common law rule of separate accrual then, the PUTSA was 
drafted to preserve it. 
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c. Pennsylvania’s Adoption of the 
Restatement of Torts 
 
Our reading of the PUTSA is also in line with the 
approach taken by the Restatement of Torts, which courts in 
Pennsylvania “have generally accepted . . . as the basic outline 
for [Pennsylvania’s] trade secrets law.”  O.D. Anderson, Inc. v. 
Cricks, 815 A.2d 1063, 1070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); see Coll. 
Watercolor Grp., Inc. v. William H. Newbauer, Inc., 360 A.2d 
200, 204 (Pa. 1976) (“The standard for determining whether 
one is liable for the use or disclosure of another’s trade secret 
is set forth in the Restatement, Torts, [§] 757 (1939) and in Van 
Products . . . .”); Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 566 A.2d at 1228 (noting 
the same).  The Restatement recognizes a cause of action not 
only for the initial disclosure of a trade secret—the confidential 
relationship view—but also for the wrongful use of a trade 
secret, explaining that a trade secret holder “may be harmed 
merely by the disclosure of his secret to others as well as by 
the use of his secret in competition with him.”  Restatement 
(First) of Torts § 757 cmt. c (1939).  As we just discussed, harm 
arising from wrongful use is the hallmark feature of the 
property view, and the Restatement embraces this theory by 
providing a cause of action for both disclosure and use of a 
trade secret.  Id. § 757.  Pennsylvania’s adoption of the 
Restatement, then, lends further support to the conclusion that 
Pennsylvania followed the separate accrual rule for 
misappropriation claims prior to the PUTSA and that the 
PUTSA was deliberately drafted to preserve it. 
 
Ultimately, the General Assembly drafted the PUTSA 
against the backdrop of Pennsylvania’s adoption of the 
Restatement of Torts and its common law rule of separate 
accrual rule for trade secret misappropriation claims, and it 
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deliberately omitted a sentence from the UTSA that rejected 
the separate accrual rule.  Adopting Esschem’s reading of the 
PUTSA, and finding that it eliminated the separate accrual rule, 
requires us to ignore legislative intent along with several 
unambiguous directives from the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court.  As a result, we hold that, under Pennsylvania law, the 
separate accrual rule applies to continuing misappropriations.11 
 
 
 
                                              
11 In so holding, we are mindful of the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas’ decision in WebDiet, Inc. v. 
NutriSystem, Inc., in which it held that the “misappropriation 
of trade secrets is [not] a continuing tort under the PUTSA,” 
using “continuing tort” to refer to the separate accrual rule.  No. 
4055 Commerce Program, 2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 
133, at *18–19 (Pa. C.P. Apr. 12, 2016).  However, the Court’s 
treatment of this issue is but a few lines long and it relied solely 
on the statement in the comment to § 6 of the UTSA that the 
“Act rejects a continuing wrong approach.”  Id.  As we already 
discussed, that statement in the comment is tied exclusively to 
the sentence that the General Assembly chose to omit and is 
inapposite to interpreting the text of PUTSA.  Sitting in 
diversity, we are “careful to avoid the ‘danger’ of giving ‘a 
state court decision a more binding effect than would a court 
of that state under similar circumstances.’”  McKenna v. Ortho 
Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 1980) (citation 
omitted).  For the reasons we have discussed, we predict the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find WebDiet similarly 
unpersuasive. 
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2. Esschem’s Arguments to the Contrary 
Are Unavailing 
 
Esschem raises two primary objections to this 
application of the separate accrual rule.  Neither is persuasive. 
 
First, following the District Court’s lead, Esschem 
argues that applying the separate accrual rule to a claim for a 
continuing misappropriation “would nullify the . . . statute of 
limitations provision.”  Appellee’s Br. 41–42.  A “continuing 
misappropriation” subject to the separate accrual rule may be 
a “continuing violation” in the colloquial sense, but it is 
conceptually distinct from the “continuing violation doctrine.”  
The District Court appears to have conflated the two. 
 
The “continuing violation doctrine” applies only to a 
narrow class of continuing violations for which courts have 
concluded that a claim accrues over time as a result of a 
“continuing pattern, practice, [or] policy” that is unlawful in 
nature.  Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 381 
(1982); see also Randall v. City of Phila. Law Dep’t, 919 F.3d 
196, 198 (3d Cir. 2019) (“This doctrine applies ‘when a 
defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice.’” (citation 
omitted)).  In such cases, “[n]o single act may be enough to 
make out a claim[, s]o the statute of limitations runs from the 
last act of the illegal conduct,” and a plaintiff “may sue for all 
acts that make out his claim, even acts that predate the 
limitations period.”  Blake, slip op. at 10 (citing Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 118, 122 (2002)). 
 
The same is not true for continuing violations subject to 
the separate accrual rule, where each violation “starts the 
statutory period running again” and “the commission of a 
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separate new overt act [within the limitations period] generally 
does not permit the plaintiff to recover for the injury caused by 
old overt acts outside the limitations period.”  Klehr v. A.O. 
Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189 (1997).  Because the separate 
accrual rule is sometimes referred to with terminology similar 
to “continuing violation,” see, e.g., Allied Erecting & 
Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Equip. & Mfg., Inc., 805 F.3d 701, 
704 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that the “‘continuing wrong’ 
approach[] [is] also known as [the] ‘separate-accrual’ rule”), it 
is perhaps unsurprising that courts and litigants confuse the 
two, see Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 
671 n.6 (2014) (warning against this exact mix-up); Blake, slip 
op. at 9–11 (describing confusion in the parties’ arguments 
about which doctrine applies). 
 
But the separate accrual rule does not “eliminate the 
statute of limitations altogether” or allow a plaintiff to “sit by 
for nearly a decade and . . . override PUTSA’s three-year 
statute of limitations,” Heraeus, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 863; it 
merely allows the plaintiff to claim as separate 
misappropriations those wrongful uses of a trade secret that 
occurred within three years of the complaint’s filing.  The 
three-year statute of limitations thus remains in full force under 
the separate accrual rule—and is far from “toothless,” 
Appellee’s Br. 44. 
 
Second, Esschem contends that Heraeus cannot benefit 
from the separate accrual rule because it did not “assert [in its 
complaint] distinct claims for each new batch of copolymers 
that Esschem has sold to Biomet,” and cannot do so because 
Esschem’s “ongoing sale of products” does not constitute a 
continuing misappropriation.  Appellee’s Br. 53.  Because the 
alleged misappropriation is not a continuing one, the argument 
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goes, but a singular one with lingering effects, Heraeus’ claim 
is time-barred even under the separate accrual rule.  
 
Esschem is right that an injury that is “the lingering 
effect[] of past unlawful conduct” is “not a continuing violation 
and . . . thus not actionable in [its] own right.”  Elad Peled, 
Rethinking the Continuing Violation Doctrine: The 
Application of Statutes of Limitations to Continuing Tort 
Claims, 41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 343, 366 (2015).  And though 
we recognize that courts, legislators, and academics may 
disagree on the exact bounds of a continuing violation,12 we 
are persuaded that Esschem’s alleged continued use of 
Heraeus’ trade secrets is within those bounds. 
 
The PUTSA’s broad definition of misappropriation 
includes a trade secret’s “use,” which Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines as “[t]he application or employment of something; 
esp., a long-continued possession and employment of a thing 
for the purpose for which it is adapted, as distinguished from a 
possession and employment that is merely temporary or 
occasional.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  The 
wrongful use that Heraeus claims against Esschem is not 
merely sales, but the continued employment of Heraeus’ trade 
                                              
12 See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 633–37 (2007), abrogated by 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (discussing whether, in an employment 
suit alleging decreased pay based on gender, the initial 
employment decision to pay the employee less or the issuance 
of each reduced paycheck was the actionable violation); Peled, 
41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. at 379–81 (proposing a new framework 
for defining continuing violations). 
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secrets in Esschem’s manufacturing process.  Such conduct, if 
proven, is well within the broad meaning of “use” and in line 
with other courts’ understanding of continuing 
misappropriations.  See Underwater Storage, 371 F.2d at 951–
52 (use of misappropriated fuel tank designs to create similar 
fuel tanks); Anaconda, 485 F. Supp. at 417–19 (use of a 
machine that was designed based on misappropriated trade 
secrets to produce telephone cord armor); Cadence Design 
Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 57 P.3d 647, 648–49 (Cal. 2002) (use 
of misappropriated source code to create new software).  And 
because the separate accrual rule applies, injuries Heraeus 
suffered due to any such uses after September 2011 are 
actionable under the PUTSA. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part and 
affirm in part the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
